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to 1931, China was hardly affected internally by the holocaustthat wa.
s%eeping the gold-standard world,Tjust as inl920-21, Germans' had
been insulated byher hvperinfiation and associated floatingrxchan
rate."
The first major country to Cut the linkwas Britain, when she left tL
gold standard in 1931. The trough of the depressionin Britain and in
other countries that accompanied Britain in leavinggold was reached
in the third quarter of 1932. In the countriesthat remained on tile gold
standard or,like Canada, that went onlypart way with Britain, the
depression dragged on. In China, whosecurrency appreciated relative to
the pound as a result of the sharp depreciationof tile pound relativeto
gold. the depression set in for die first timein 1931.
Of course, the country in tile vanguardof such an internationalmove-
rnent need not stay there. France, which hadaccumulatec, s laree stock of
gold as a result of returning to the goldstandard in 1928 at .' exchange
rate that undervalued the franc, and thereforehad much leeway, atsome
point passed the United States and not only beganto add to its gold stock
but also, after late 1931, to draingold from the United States Thelink between the franc and the dollarwas cut when the United Statessus- pended gold pa)ments in March 1933,which proved to be the business
cycle trough for the United Statesand countries closely linkedto itIn France. which stayed on gold fora further interval, the contractioi1
(Iragged on still longer. Althoughthere was an upturn from July1932 to July 1933, the low point of theinterwar years was not reacheduntil April 1935.
5. Development ofMonetary Policy
The course of monetary policyin the difficult and criticals'ears of the contraction was greatly influencedby the struggle forpower within tile Federal Reserve S'.tem, thebeginnings of whichwere described in the preceding chapter. At the timeof the stock marketcrash, the New York Reserve Bank acted in thetradition of its earlierdominancer11ovifl" rapidly, decisively, andon its own. The adversereaction of the Board greatly inhibited furtherindependent measures b.New York In 1930. New York stronglyfavored expansio!sarVopen markct opria. tions, but after the middleof the'car was unable to persuadeeither ti:' other Bank governors_allof whom by thi5 timehad become members of the reorganizyd Open MarketPolicy Conferencewhich replaced die earlier Open Market InvestmentCommittee..or theBoard in Wash- ington. The samewas true in1931, except thatNew Yorkwas less 'Arthur Salter, China andSilver, New York,Economic Forum 1934pp 3-6 15-1?.




































vigorous ill 1)iesstng for expansionary action, though it was nowsupported
by the new governor(Eugene Meyer) of the Federal Reserve Board.
The reaction to Britain's departure- from gold did not provoke a flare-up
of those conflicts. The measuresadopted at that time were favored by
almostallaffiliatedwith the System. The agreement reflectedthe
dominant importance then attached to the preservation of thegold
standard and the greater signiuicance attached toexternal than to
internal stability, by both the System and the community atlarge. Not
long after, the differences withinthe System that had been submcred
in the fall of 1931 rc-emered,New York generally pressing for ex-
palisiOnalY open marketoperations, supported by the governor and
some other members ofthe Board and by a few Bank governors, and
opposed by most of the Bank governors.
'Ihe open market operation of 1932 was acceded to largelyunder Con-
gressiona1pressure and withthe new Glass-Steagall Act ostensibly
1ermittg release of the System's expansionary powers.The operation
was terminated in August.shortly after Congress adjourned, because so
many Bank governorsremained unenthusiastic about the policy and
reluctant or unwilling to pursue it. Tuedeadlock persisted through the
rest of the contraction.
THE STOCK MARKET CP.ASH OCTOBER1929
At the time of the stock market crash,the Open Market Investment
Committee consisted of five Bank governors with theNew York governor
as chairman. It wasoperating under its recommendation to the Board,
September 4, which had been approved by theBoard on October 1. to
purchase "not to exceed $25,000,000 a week"of short-term government
securitiesif needed to supplement purchases of acceptances,"for the
purpose of avoiding any increaseand, if possible, facilitating some further
reduction in the total volume of memberbank discounts ......Up to
the week ending October 23, theCommittee had not made any govern-
inent security purchases becausebills had been available. The Ssstem's
holdings had declined by $16 million, while itSbill holdings had increased
by $115 million.16
When the crash came, the New York Bankhad no doubt about what
steps should be taken andproceeded to take them. It purchased $160
million of government securities in addition toencouraging New York
banks to discount freely. The amountpurchased was far iii excess of the
amount that the Open MarketInvestment Committee was authorized
to purchase, but the New YorkBank did not claim to be operating forthe
Committee. It contended it had the right topurchase government secu-
Harrison. Open Market. Vol.I, nhLnute5, Sept. 24, 1929, and letter,dated
Oct. 1, 1929, Young to Harrison.//
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rities for its own account,as a matter of general credit policy, without the
Board's approval.lt Harrison informedGovernor Young of the Federal
Reserve Board that his directors hadatithori;ed him to purchasegovern.
rnent Securities without limitationas to amount, and that on October 29,
before the call loanrate was announced, a purchase had beenarranged
Members of the Board regardedthe New York Bank's fai!ureto seek
the authorization of the Boardbefore taking actionas smacking of in-
subordinationthough some regarded theation itself as desirable As
a legal matter, the Nw York Bankseemed clearly within its rightsUnder the 1923 agreement settingup the Open MarketInvestmentConiiriittc'e, each Reserve Bank retained theright to purchase and holdgovernment securities for its ownaccount, Young and most Boardmembers acknow!- edged the legal rightvet felt that the challengeto the Board's authority was InsupportableAfter much discussionthe Board finallyauthorized Young to tell Harrisonthat, if New York shouldrequest approval of a reduction of its rate to 5per cent, the Board wouldconsent on condition that no further purchasesofgovernmentsecurities be madeexcept with approval of the BoardOn November i, thediscount rate at the New ork Bank wasso reduced To the New Yorkdirectors it was clearthat the Svstep-i oughtto proceed immediately withfurther purchases for "unless thisis done, after theevents of the past weeks,therc ma' be creator danger of a recession inbusmess withconsequent depression and linemplosment whichwe should do all in ourpower to prevent" as they declaredin a resolutiontheyadopted on November 7,75Under the leadership of Harrison, theOpen Market InvestmentConimirtee mPeting Nosemnber 12,recommended that "thepresent limit of $?5,0000ftOper week on the purchaseofos'ernmen( securities beremoved and that the Committee be authorizedinlieuthereof to purchasenot to exceed S200,00o 000 ofgovernment securities foraccount of such banksas care to participate ..," havingin mind also the fact"that present condi- tions may possibly developto the point where,as an ernergencmeasure, in the interest ofmaimstaininrr hankine andbusiness stabilityit may be n°cessarv quickly to purchaselarge amounts ofGovernment seclirities in ordertoavoidanyundue stringency incredit, "'
"Of the $160t1!jon Cocrnmentsecuritjepurchased be Ntv Vorl, inthe week endinOct30, S5 millionwas transferd to Sssmt'rnaccount During the follow. me t5oeeksthe Nework Bank liouwbian addiffllnJi $25 auth00diretlfor System arcounm
"HamIsa, Diary, Volt 6. Oct.29011929 pp1t17196 Miller didrot ('On. sider the purchase desirablelie siCeesteda reioiutio0 to the effectthat the Board wouid not hateapprosed the purchase hadit hen Consultedthat Ness York usas more concerned about thestock market than mhgeneral credit situationthat forcing the banksto cot-ne to the discountwindow would Fat'been the prs-)er response
For the rosol t1oflse-c ii arriso,.\sc eI an'.,,05 '01
1 Open Market Vol. 1.minutes of nuretdNot-2 l9QTHE GREAT CONTRACTION
The next day,LliBc,aïdnotified the Committee that "the general
situation was not sufficientlyclarified for the System to formulate and
adopt a permanent openmarket policy at that time," but conceded that if
"an emergency shouldarise with such suddenness and be so acute that it
is not practicable toconfer with the Governor, the Board will interpose
no objection to apurchase operation being undertaken, with the under-
standing, however, that promptadvice of such purchase be furnished the
Board."'
On November 15, GovernorYoung of the Federal Reserve Board was in
New York, and Harrisonhad an exchange of views with him: "1 told
him," Harrison wrote inrecording the interview, "that I wanted a very
frank and complete conversationwith him regarding our present dif-
ferences in the matter ofthe purchase of government securities that
it had become obviousthat the Federal Reserve Board and the directors
of the Federal ReserveBank of New York were reaching a point intheir
views regarding theirrespective powers where it mieht have veryserious
consequences unless wecould come to some sort of a workable under-
standing or agreement -Itold him that more and more the Board
had taken to itself notsupervisory powers but the equivalent ofoperating
functions and the responsibilityfor the detailed transactions of the various
Federal reserve banks..."Harrison then reviewed the Board's veto,
earlier in 1929 for a periodof four months, of the increase in thediscount
rate the directors ofthe New York Bank had repeatedlyvoted: the Board's
decision that year to fix thespread above the nsirsimum buying ratefor
acceptances within whichthe Bank might operate, although ithad never
done so earlier, and, duringthe fall of the year, its actualdetermination
of the minimum rate, whichhad always been the Bank'sprerogative; and
finally, its stand
that we should go to theFederal Reserve Board in advancefor a prior
approval of any transaction-S in governmentsecurities I told him that she
logical consequence of his point ofview, which was that the FederalReserve
Board should approve of all thesethings in advance, was thatthe Federal
Reserve Board would beconsr acentral bank operating inWashington --
His only comment was that theFederal Reserve Board had beengi'en most
extraordinarily svide powers. that as long asthe Board had those powers.they
would feel free to exercise themand Congress could determinesshether they
objected to having a central bankoperating in Washington-a
Neither side was prepared tomake any concessionsuntil Governor
Young had a meeting with OwenD. Young, deputy chairmanof the
board of directors of the New YorkBank, in the office of Secretaryof the
Treasury Mellon. the ex-officiochairtnan of the ResereBoard, on
November 22 to discuss the Board's powerover transactions ingoveri5
Ibid.,letter, dated Nov. 13, 1929, Young tol-larnson.
Harrison, Conversations, Vol. I, Nov.15. 1929-THE GREAT CONTRACTION
inent securities. Secretary Mellon said hewas willing to give the Ni'st York
directors the stidest discretion, buthe realized that the Board had rights
and duties in liii- matter. OweoI). Young said lit saw norCasofl--apart
from sudden critical emergenciesabout which there was no disputehis
directors could not obtain theconsent of the Board to all major trans-
actions. Governor Young repliedthat was just what the Board wanted.t
The next day, November 23,Governor Young and Secretary Mellon
met with Harrison. who stated that"we in New York s crc willing and
prepared to operate any policyagreed upon either forour own account or for the Sstens account" Younganswered that he was preparedto
approve without reservation the OpenMarket Investment Committee's
reLotninendation of Novetnlwr 12, butfirst wanted to know
st-herethisswould leave the debatedquestion of the York batiks operating for its ott ii account. I ilarrisontold hini that I felt that this ins'nlv,'d a matter of proccdurand jurisdiction which I wouldlike to !"avt' for de- terriljti,ition s000'timne later on whenwe were through this critit-al period ,snd ohmis e could stork out some mutuallysatisfactoproc"dure 'then condi- tions and peoples' emotionswere in a quieter and more normalstateI th"n made this propositionThat if the Federal ReserveBoard would apProve thOpen \farket InvestmentCommittee's report without qualification,leasing it to the committee toexecute, I would recommend toOur directors on next
Wednesday [November 271that the Federal Reserve Banicof New York fraiii,until such time as it and theFederal Reserve Board niight forntiij,ite sonie mutually satisfactoiv procedure,from purchasing got omimentsecurities for its ossn accountas a matter of general credit policyivithout the Boaid's approval,
As a result of tltis understanding,the Board reconsidered November25, arid toted to approve theCommittee's recommendation andthe policy oudirsed in the resolution of thedirectors of the New YorkBankAl- thoueh authorized to purchase$200 million, the Committeepurchased only S155 rnilhon hetiteenNovember 27, 1929. and January1. 1930. In responsetoinquiries from other Banks about theNew York purchases during the week ofthe stock snarket crash, Harrisonwrote a iong letter to allgoeerno5 on November 27, describingthe situationis New York at the time.exp1aininthe reasons for diemeasures the Bank took, and ds'ietsding them. Sonìegovernors ssipported the action andcx-
Itaridjo. D:am VoL. No;. 1?. 13, 22. 1929, pp 13. 1. 20-22.31-32 1 he motions to approvewas passed 5 to 3, the Secretary oftije Trrsui' and the Comr,troller toting withGovernor Young. Vice-GovernorPlait, and Flanslin Miller objected on the groundthat "monet wasnow cheap and would be made cheaper by the purchase ofGovernment seCurities" and thatii would bt bad Federal Reserve policy_"abdjcattonin favor of the Federal Reser'.eBank of New York." The two other negativevotes were caat by Board membersEdward Cun- ningham. an Iowa farmer, andGeorge James, a Memphisninrehantsee sectien 7, below), Harrison, Miscellaneous,Vol. 1, letter, dated Nov.25. 1929, Young to Ilarrisc.n; Otce, Vol. 11,memorandum of Nov. 25, 1929; HajnljnDiary, Vol 17, Nov. 24, 25, 1929,pp. 35-36, 38-40.
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presseti wdliriirvss to l)arttcipats' in the ihws. Others criticiied tl;e
action on the ground that it niciely delayed "natural liquidation' and
fierce recovefy.
The situation which confronted the New York Bank during the first
few weeks alter the crash was to recur during the succeeding years of
the contraction:it had a policy, which the Board or the other Banks
would not approve, or would approve only reluctantly after protracted
discussion. At the time of the crash, New York svcnt ahead on its own.
Though the Bank then yielded to the Board in November 1929, later on
it again considerc'd but, as wi' shall we, did not adopt, the alternative of
iinoring the System account arid purchasing for its own account, as it
had in October 1929.
FROM TILE STOCK MARKET CRASH TO 1IRITAIN'S
OEPAKTCRE FROM 001.0,1929 3!
From the time of the crash on, the New York Bank favored the reduction
of discount rates and purchtaw of 1)1115 arid secsiritii's in suflicieritiv larc'e
amounts to offset reductions in discounts. "1 he do cctoiof the New York
Bank apparently voted to reduce the discount rate from 5 per cent to
44 per cent for the first time on November 11, 1929, and the Board gave
its approval. On January 30, 1930, the directors voted to reduce the rate
to 4 per cent; the Board disapproved by a tic vote. On Febniary 7, the
reduction was again voted by the directors and on the first vote by the
Board acain lost on a tiesoit'. One niemniu'r then changed his vote to
affirmative, not because he approved the rate reduction, but because he
disapproved defeat of a motion net a tie vole: co the reduction was ap-
proved. The reduction of the rate to 3per cent ott March it was ap-
parently approved by the Board tIn' first tulle the directors voted it. On
April 2+, the directors voted to reduce tilehiccotirit rate to 3 per cent ; the
reduction was disapproved b' the Board. It was voted again on May 1,
with the directors this time even considering hut iis'tidint against a public
statement if the Board should again disapprove. I lowevu'r. the Board ap-
proved it.Siesmilar repeated delas sscrc' encountered in gettIng Board
approval of reductions in buying rates liii hmlls."
Harrison, Miscellaneous, Vol. I. Nov. 21929; for (ril!uonu, see Notes. Vol.
1. sneering of executive cotnunlittee june ¶i, 19 I'J
- For time before Apr. 17, I 9:to, she first date of tiutuiro of dirrct"rs' nneCt
ir,gs of the New York Reserve Ikink in tfu,- I larrison I" w" luacsrrlied mainly
on ilanulin's Diar for statements about delays in Board approval ofNew York
requests for re(lucilons in discount rates. I larnisri sirnpiv rinSes tlue Boardsapproval
on Nov. 14, 1929, without indicating whether the snorion to reduce wa beforethe
Board for the firstSimile, lie does not reter to the riductrim in she rate. elfccttvc
Mar. 14,1930. (See flanilin, l)isry, Vol. 17, Nov.14. 199: Jan. 30. Feb. 6,
Apr. 24, May 1, 1930. pp. 23, 87, 97, 1391 11, 145-146; aho harrison, Miscel-




New York had even lesssuccess in winning approval ofits recoin-
niendations for open market purchases. Afterthe purchases in the final
months of 1929, which were in accordwith the usual seasonal pattern of
increase in Federal Reserve creditoutstanding, the Open Market Invest-
ment Committee was most reluctantto engage in further purchases
Some members were iii favor of sellinggovernment securities in the usual
pattern of the post-Christmasseason. The final recommendation of the
January meeting of the Committeewas that "no open market operations
in Government securities fwerejnecessary at this time either to haltor to
expedite the present trend of credit."8
In early March, concernedabout the worsening of theeconomic situa- tion and the inability of theNew York Bank to maintainits bill portfolio.
the directors of the Bankvoted to authorize purchase of$50 million of
government securities. The purchaseswere carried out after approval by
the Board and a circularletter to all BankCovernors asking whether the' wanted to participate. Whenthe Open Market Committeemet formally at the end of March, itconcluded that "at present thereis no occasion for further purchases ofGovernment securjtjes'ct
That was the finalmeeting of the Open MarketInvestment Committee. It was replaced by theOpen Market PolicyConference of all twelve Bank governr5, with an executivecommittee consisting initially ofthe same five governors who hadconstituted the Committee(New York, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,Philadelphia) But theexecutive committeewas in a different position fromthe former Committee.It was entru5ted with executing policy decisionsof the Conference: itdid not, like the earlier Committee, both initiateand execute policy. TheConference itselfre- mained a voluntaryorganization of equals. EachBank was free to decide whether it wouldor would not participatein a purchaseor sale recom- mended by the Conference,though dissenterswere required to acquaint the Federal ReserveBoard and the chairmanof the executiveconlmittee with the reasons fornot participating. EachBank also reservedthe option to withdraw fromthe Conference NewYork was not at allhappy about the change andconsented to it reluctantlyand only w itEm theex- plicit proviso that theConference hadno authoritt' overtransactions in
dated Mar. 17. 1930,Case to GovernorYoung and a letterdated Apr 29 h'arrjon to Platt: NotesVol. 1. Apr. 24. May1. 1930 At the Open MarketPolicy Conferencemeeting on Mat' 21-221930, (osemor Harrison reported that'In a number ofrecent weeks the FederalResere Board had failed toapproe without delayapplications of the FederalReserve Bar.lc of New York for a lowerminimum buying rateon hills, and that forconsiderable penods the New York bankhad therefore beenwithout any downwardHexihilit in its bill buyingrate as was the caseat that very time" (OpenMarket Vol 1 Ibid., minute, ofmeeting. Jan. 28-29,1930. Miscellaneous Vol. 1.letter, dated Mar 7,1930, Case to allgoorIsr,: Open Market, Vol. 1,mtnutm of meeting, Mar.24-25, 1930
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bankers' acCeptaflceS.As in 1929, New York hoped to be able toaccom-
plish through the purchase of bils what it might not be able to persuade
the rest of the System to do through transactions in governissent securities.
Unfortunately, New York was not successful with its alternative.
At its first meeting in May 1930. the Open Market Policy Conference
made no recommendation but left limited authority in the hands of the
executive comnhitee. Early in June, Harrison recommended that the
System undertake the purchase of $25 million a week for a two-week
trial period, arguing that "small purchases of Government securities at
this time could do no harm. .and might be desirable" and, as in
earlier years, suggesting that security purchases be resorted to only if
easing through the acceptance market failed. The recommendation to
purchase was much milder than the statements at the meetings of the
New York directors, and the amount recommended was much smaller
than they thought desirable. Indeed, "there was some reluctance" on the
part of the New York directors "to accept this program on the grounds
that our difficulties of credit administration have grown largely out of our
disposition to postpone action and to administer remedies in homeopathic
doses." Apparently, however. Harrison felt that a bold program was cer-
taut to be rejected and preferred agreement on a small program to rejec-
tion of a large one. A majority of the executive committee and of gov-
ernors agreed (after being consulted by telephone or telegram), the Board
approved, and the purchase was made. A decline in the System's bill
holdings during the two weeks largely offset the effect of the purchase of
government securities,so, on June 23, Harrison suggested that pur-
chases Continue in the amount of about $25 million a week. This time, the
executive committee rejected the recommendation by a vote of 4 to 1.°
Faced with a clear rejection of its leadership, the New York Bank
considered three alternatives: (1) simply to accede without further action
in the hope that its views would eventually prevail(2to "withdraw
from the... Conference and,assuming that the approval of the Federal
Reserve Board either can he or need not be secured, purchase Govern-
ment securities for the account of this bank":3to conduct a campaign
of persuasion. The Bank adopted the third alternative, perhaps partly
because Harrison had lingering doubts about the validity of New York's
Commenting the following year on the change, Harrison was recorded by
Hamlin as saving that "he had always elt it was a mistake to put alt the Governors
on the Open Market Policy Conference, that the Governors cameinstructed by
their directors: that under the former System the Executive Committee were ne er
so instructed" (Hamlin, Diary, Vol. 19,Aug193!. p.123). See also Harrison,
Open Market, Vol. E, minutof meeting. Mar. 24-2, l930 Notes. VoL 1, May I,
l930 Open Market, Vol. 1, letter, dated May5. 1930. Case to Young.
Harrison, Open Market, Vol.1,minutes ofrneetLrig, May 21-22,1930;
Miscellaneous, Vol.1,telegram dated June 3, 1930, Harrison to \ oung; Notes,
Vol. I, June 5, 1930: Open Market, \'Ot1, June 23, 1930.
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position. As the report on the relevant directors' meeting has it. thedi'r.
ston to adopt the third alternative was influenced by the existence ofa
'real difference of opinion among those deemed capable offorming a
judgment, as to the power of cheap and abundant credit, alone,to bring
about improvement in business and in conirnoditv prices.'''1
In Jul' 1930. Harrison accordinglyscrore a long letter to all governors,
telling them his directors ''feltso earnestly the need of continuing pur-
chases of government securities that they havesuggested that I write to
you outlining some of the reasons why the Federal Reserve Bankof New
York has for so many months favored havingthe Federal Reserve Svstens
do es erything possible and within itspower to facilitate a recover\ of
business." There followed a clos&'lvreasoned, informed, arid well docu-
mented analysis of the economic situationand the problemof monetary
policy. Harrison stressed the seriousneSS ofthe recession, indicated that
ss hilt' there were many other causes of therecession, tight money of tite
preceding two years had contributedto it, and placed greatest importance
on the depressed state of the bond market and thelimited availabihtv of
funds forlong-term financing. "In previousbusiness depressions.' lie
wrote, "recovery has never taken place untilthere has been a stronbond
market." Harrison acknowledgedthat there was little demand forshort-
term funds, and that "when the Systembuys securities, short-timemnones'
becomes more plentiful and cheaper."However, "it has been denionstratt'd
in the past that in such circumstances,through a further increase in the
reserves of member banks money will bemade available for the bond
market or shifted to the bondmarket from-n the short dine marketor from
other investments less profitablethan bonds," He pointedout that Federal
Reserve credit had declinedand that banks were sensitiveto borrowing. "fAin even small amount ofborrowing underpresent conditions is as effective a restraint assubstantiahls' a greateramount was a year ago." He
concluded that "while theremay be no definite assurance thatopen market operations ingovernment securities will of themselvesPromote any immediate recovery, wecannot foresee any appreciable harmthat can rc'sut froiri such a policy arid believethat the seriousness of thepresent d pression is sogreat as to justify takingevery possible step to facilitate ini()rovrmfl9''
Ons' no:able omission fromHarrison's letter was referenceto the stock of money, as such. Like almostevery other documenton monetary policy
flarrisc.z,Notes\'ol.1,June 26,1930. On set eraloccasionstiarrisor, re'.ealed doubts (Notes. Vol. 1.July 17, Sept. 17, 1930).rt is clear from internal documents of the Bank that thetechnical personnel, r,otahlvW. P.. Burgess and Carl Snyder, were themost conSistent Supporters ofexpanijonan. measures ona large scale. Perhaps becauseof shete doubts, perhapsbecause of his overridn¼' desire to Set tire consensusharrison continued toir"s"nt to the rest of the St.tnr purchase pcoposals scaled downwell below hit'letlthat sornC of the direcwrs and Sec !nnnraI personnel of the Bankrenrirned ot desirable
Miscellaneous, Vol. 1. letter datedJuiv 3.19.10. Harrison to allgo; emnor;.TUE (REAT CONTRACTION
within the System until the 1950's,the emphasis was exclusivelyon
credit conditions rather titanthe stock of money Flowevir1110
did riot affect the pchcy conclusionit only altered the line ofareurnent
through which it was reached. Consideration of the behavior of the stock
of money would have lcd to precisely thesZIrnI'C(tflClUsto!i: that the Sys'
tern should act so as to prevent a reductionitt the amount of hii-
powered money available and indeed so as to inCrease it. Moreover, as
we saw in section 3. there was a particularly close Connection at the time
between the bond market :intl the nioney stock. Iniprovement in the hood
market wottld have done much to avert the stibseqitent bank failures.
And though this cottni'r'tion was not explicttit)tire lcttr'r, it was ilflj)liCit.53
Uarrisons letter and the replies to it 1)rovide an extraordinarily ihilitninat-
ing and comprehensive picture of attitudes toward monetary matters
within tire Svstetrt. Univ two er'vernnrs--Euyrene Black of Atlanta arid
George Sea' of Ricltrnondclearly and uriamlsi"tiotis!s'o'reed with
Harrison's analysis and supported Ins polnv r"cnnttr,endations, l'he rest
disagreed, most of them sharply.
James McDouical of Chicago wrote that it sertncd to him titco' was
"ats abundance of funds in the nianket, and tinder these circttrnstancr's as
a matter of prudence t should heilit'ohicv of the Federal Reserve
System to ritaintam a position of strength, in readiness to meet future
demands, as and when they arise, rather than to put reserve funds into
the market when not needed.''lie went on to Stress the datiger that
'speculation might easily arise itt come other direction" than rn the stock
marker. Mr'Douga! had all along been the rOust outspoken opponent of the
New York policy and was to rernait for the rest of the contraction a con-
sisterit proponent of selling government securities on almost any occasion.
The demands for which the System shotild husband its resources rertsained
in the future. McI.)o'iszal's outlook was pdrticltiarly influential because
Chicago was next only to New York in ImportanceOSa tiniancial center,
and because he had been with the Svstetiio long. \lcflorieal haul been
appointed governor ot the Chricago Ratik at its founding in 1911. at the
same time Strong was appointed covet nor in New York. hihad had
disagreements with New York on "art icr orrasnoris
' One Important arlsantaze of explicit attention to the stork of money. hr'th on
that ccc s ion art Cllater, would Ii ave horn provision ina c natty dr' fin ,'d inin 11Cr
by whi.h to judge in qirarititatise rerun tfv' n"ents arid ef,'crn of roilcvthe out-
riderisitrurk,iiireading the reports of dscrissinnc svntlnirdin'Sutn'rir.Ins'the
r',teuenicst and In' t!CCdimofhe er icr aisC':!For ,'xam no, w ihtire ''iiy''ds of
buuin,'ss'' undefined, one tartnratrtn"ntard'd 'credit.'' akin rruid,'fiumrd.as'ru'-
dundant,'' another sc''sight.'' tin if ncrmnmnimrl uimvrne oflis,oursi' am1 in-
abiiitvtori',lni,,'nlifF,r,'n,''sii ,t'mnn''rntn,1',.ttittt.'ntrs ''vrrrnsss',rn'proi,rFlv
important far trims emmailirig ,lntferenrccs tonvrsst for so long dcliii cnn aprrn'snh tin a
roiling of trniit'ls
" Itarrison,\lisellanu'orrs, Vol Iliter, datenlJtiivIi),I 'lIlt,McDn'rriar to
tarn ssrrI,rsl 'c V. art nfl' r.lIen aToin SIr on('enr il lien em Brook rigs,I 9
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John U. Calkins of San Franciscowas no less explicit than Mcl)ougal
was. In an earlier letter to Governor Youngexplaining why San Francisco
had not participated inthe June open market purchases,he had stated that "with credit cheapand redundant we donot believe that business
recovery will be accelerated by makingcredit cheaper andmore re- dundant." In his replyto Harrison's letter, he repeatedthe sentiment, expressed the view that "thecreation, promotion,or encouragement of a bond market" is not "withinthe province of the FederalReserve System," and that "noencouragemfl of the market for foreignbonds can counter- balance the destructive effectupon our foreign trade of thetariff bill recently approved" Hewent on to say, "We believe thatthe volume of credit forcibly fed to themarket up to this time hashad no considerable good effect, certainlyno discernible effect in the last fewmonths. We also believe that every timewe inject further credit withoutappreciable effort, we diminish the probable advantageof feedinmore to time market at art opportune nionlert whichmay come
Lynn P. Tallev of Dallaswrote that his directorswere not 'incijnd to countenance much interferencewith economic trendsthrough artificial methods to composeSituations that in thernselvm,'scrow out of events recognized at the timeas being fallacious_areference to the stock market speculation of1928-29, Talley's letter,like some othersreveals resentment at New York's failureto cart-v the day in 1929and the feeline that existing difficultieswere the proper punishmentfor the System's past misdeeds in not checkingthe hull market. "Ifa physician," wrote Talley, "either neglectsa patient, or even though hedoes all hecan for the patient within thelimits of his professionalskill accordingto his best judgment, and the patientdies, itis conceded to bequite impossibleto bring the patient backto life through theuse of artificial respirationor Injections of adrenaiin,"s
W. B. Geery ofMinneapolis wrote that"there is danger ofstimulatin financjnwhich will leadto still moreoverproduction whileattemptine to make it easy to do financingwhich will increaseConsumption's' George W. Norris ofPhiladelphia repliedthat discussions withan insurance companyexecutive and with a privatebanker in Philadelphia had confirmed him inhis ownew "of the fruitlessnessand ursjsdoni of attempting to depress stillfurther the abnornialllow interestrates now presailmn." Later in theyear. at a meeting of theOpen Market Poik Conference mrs SeptemberNorris, in strongdisagreensej1with what he regarded as thecurrent policy of the System,read a lengthymemorandum summarizing the Philadelphiaview The PhiladelphiaBatik objectedto MiscellaneousVol.I,letter, dated June16, 1930 Ca1k105to Youngletter dated Juty 10, 1930.Calkini to Harrison
- Miscellaneous Vol. 1. letter,dated July 15. 1930,Talky to Harrison Ibid.,letter, dated July 7, 1930,Geerv to HarrisonTHE CREAT CONTRACTION
"the pieserit abnormally loss ran's for mont's'' as an intt'rference ''with
the ol,eratiofl of the natural law 01 supply and demand 115the turnips'
market .....and concluded, ''this is a coitiplt'te anti literal reversal
the policy stated in the Board's Tenth Annual Report... We have been
putting out credit in a period of depression, when it WaS flOt wanted and
could not be used, and will have to withdraw credit when itis wanted
and carl be usetI.'
These views, which seem to us confused and misguided, were by no
means restricted to the Reserve Sstein. Tilt' Federal Advisory Council,
whose members were leading bankers throughout the country, consistently
adopted recommendations expressing the same point of view, using
phrases such as, "the present situation will be best served if the natural
flow ofcredit is unhampered by openmarket. opt'ranors."However, even
in the financial community, the New York Reserve Baisk was not alone
in its view of the situation. The Jul1930 monthly lettet of the Royal
Harrison. Miscellaneous, Vol.I,letter, dated July 8, Norris to Harrison;
Open Market, \'ol.1, memorandum read by Norris at Sept. 25, 1930, meeting.
The memorandum is such a remarkably clear statement of the reai hills doctrine
that was so widely accepted at the time and earlier that itis worth qioting at
greater length. The policy which had
created artihicially low interest ratet, and artificially high prices ¶or government
securities.-.is an ifljuttiCC to our member banksIt had resulted in making
open market operations usurp the discc.urst funs uon, and tends so foster the
regrettable impression that there is some element of impropriety in borrowing
by member banks . -.[A]s the result of injecting a large amount of unasked
and unneeded Federal Reserve credit into an already glutted money market, we
find ourselves with over 600 rnilIionof gosernments on hand, the hulk of which
must ultimately be disposed of . .- We do not undertake to civ how much
Federal Reserve credit should be in use today, but we do hold to the belief that
a substantial part of it should be the result of a demand expressed in borrowing
by member banks, and used in cooperatiots with those banksLess than one-
sixth of it is of this character today.
In addition to the letters quoted, and the two 1rons Black and Seav, a brief
letter was sent to Harrison by 0. slAttcherv, deputy eovernor at St. Louis, on
behalf of Governor Martin. on vacation. expressing doubts and siat:ng that condi'
lions in the Eighth District prosided no justification for turth"r open market pur-
chases IMiscellaneous. \'ol.I,letter. dated July 9l950 .Frederic H. Curtiss,
chairman of the Boston Bank, sent a lengthy letter dated July 9the Boston Bank
at the time had no governor, Harding has ing died in April. and Young. still
governor of the Board, not yet having been appointed to fillthe Boston Bank
vacancy. Coytiss' letter expressed strung opposit:on to further purchases on the
ground that they were likely to feed the stock market rather than the bond market.
Only she Federal Reserve Bank of Cleseland did not reply, but its gosemor
acknowledged the letscr by telephone. In a letter to Governor \oiing.H.srrison
summarized the views expressed by Governor Fancher of Cleveland on his own
behalf and as spokesman for a majority of his directors. "that continued purchases
of government securities would riot contribute substantially to .-recovery and
that, therefore, they would not .. .favor further purchases'Miscellaneous, Vol.
I. letter, dated July 23.1 930. Harrison to \oung
Quoted front recommendation, dated Nov. 13, 1930Federal Reserve Board,
Annual Report for 1930, p. 228.0
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Bank of Canadauiicluiled th,tt'iit.iz.eie arid dicisivc' action on tle
parr of the Federal Reserve Banks rn viittrtig new fundsinto the ns.ket
in large volume is what isnecessary to arrest the present serious anti
protracted price decline and to change thepresent psvclloof business
One cannot read the correspondence with HarrisonJust rtvieued, the
minutes of open market meetings, and similar ReserveSystem docuinc-nts
without being impressed withthe extraordinary dilfercnces betweenNew
York and most of tire other Banksin the level of sophistication and
understanding about monetary matters. Years ofprimary anti direct
responsibility for the conduct ofmonetatv policy in the central money
market of the country and of cooperationvitlt men simiiar!placed in
the other leadrng money markets ofthe world had developed inthe
technical personnel, officers, and directorsof thi' New York Banka
profound awareness of monetary relationsand a w!tsiti'.'C recognition of
ttie efiects of monetary policyactions. Those t1ualities were clearly absent
atroost other Rescryc Barik. which had ofnccesitv hetni concerned
pi manly with hero and regionalmatters, or at the Federal Rcser
Board, which had played onlya minor role in the general conductof polrcv and had hadno iltiportant operating functions.
lire largely negativeresponse evoked by Harrison's letter inducedNew York on ses eraloccasions during July to consider againengagingri
open marKet purchases on itsown but with the approval of the Boardand Hatrjson sounded out thesentiment of the Board about suchaction Tie jesuits were stnfflcicntl'unfavorable to deter any attempt.'5°
B' September. 1930,some of the Banks were even opposedto seasonal easing. As Harrison told hisdirectors.
Some of the other FederalReserve Banks, including perhapsa majority of th.' banks whose governors formthe executive comnrittecof the Svcteni Open Market Policy Conferenceadvocate a policy of correctionrather than oin. ticipanmon. They could allowtightening of thc money niarisetand hardcnii:g of rates of interestto develop, and then wouldmove to correct the dtuarien rhrouth the purchase ofGos'errmient securities.
A few days later, whenCarl Snyder, ata meeting of the officers' council of the\ew \ ork Bank, suggestedthat'this deflation shouldnow be aggres5j clv conthaited be additional purchases ofGovernment securitie Harrison replied that"from a Systemstandpoint itis a practical Impossibility to embarkon such a program at thepresent timeto do would mean an activedivision of Systempolicy "°
Despite the declinein Federal Rcserecredit outstanding the Board described its policy forthe year 1930as one of "mnonetaease ...ex- pressed through tmepurchase atintervais of additionalUnited Stales
Harrison Notes Vol. 1,July tO, 24, 1930and Office \'e[1!, June 3. 19 Not, \ 01. 1, Sept. ii,17, 1930,TUE (tREAT C0NTRAcTlo'.
Gc1vcrnnentC( tirittes and in progressive reciur horn, ofreserve bank dis-
count and acceptance ratcs."iOi This isa striking illustration of the
ambistuitof the ternisiTlonetarv ease'' and "ttghtness" and of the need
stressed aboven.272to Interpret Federal Reserve actions in thelight
of all the forces afiecting the stork of iisotiev arid credit conditionsIt
seems ixiradoxical to describe as "monetary ease a policy ss hich permitted
the stock of money to decline in fourteen months isv a percentageex-
ceeded only four times in the preceding bUy-four \cars and thenonly
during extremely ces crchtisinpss_cvcie contractions And those words
seem especially paradoxteal when other factors were tending to expand
thifl money stock, so that a potential expansion was con';erted intoan
actual eontsaction entirely liv the decline in Federal Rseive creditout-
standing.
In tile context of the cinothen o curring in the economy and in the
money markets tin. pislic'; fol!ow.d should he regarded as one of monetary
"tightness" not 'ease.' During a periodif severe economic eontract:oit
extending over more titan aar. die S stein was Content to letits dis-
counts decline bnear lv twice its net purchases of governirient securities.
and to letits total credit outstanding decline by almost three times the
increase in the gold stock. Through earls' l932. the most striking feature
of the Sstenis portfolio of governirlerit secs:rities and hills bought is the
usual seasonal pattern of consi .lCtinn (hiring the btst half of theear and
expansion during the second From AtigristI 929 to OctoberI 93Q the
whole increase inovernmcnt securities plus bills hotght Caine in the
second half of 1929. The Svsterns holdings of gnvernment securities plus
hills bought were nearly2OO million lower at the end of July 1 9l) than
they were at the end of December 1929. Even a mechanical continuation
of the Systems earlier cold steriii'ation program, by which it had quite
explicitly recognized the need to detennine Itstions in light of other
factors outside its control.otilr1 have called foriltore s'ieoro'ls expan-
sionary acron front August 1929 to Octohet 1910. Such action would
have linsited the decline in Federal Reserve credit osittanding to 5211)
million, the mnaeiiitude of the rise in the gold stock. instead of allowing
the actual seasonally adjusted decline cf 5590 million. As we read the
earlierpolicy statements of the Board. they called for going besond
mechanical gold sterilizationitstew of contetnpoi dry economic condo
dons. Since tile hull market in sor ks had coll.tpsec! and there were no
signs of anvthinapl)roacl1inspeculatton in corttrnoditic. :lnv expansion
in credit would be likc!y to lie. itt the- words of the T nt/i Annual Report
for 1923- "restricted to productive uses.'
1s
Federal Reo'r'e- Board.1 -otu'ti R,'r,'rt 1w t 9O.
It should he rioted. h OWC Cr.hat the hi! iv that raw mmmv cord rims
rnihr Stiflhltldtspeculative mx esses rn tlisstock marker was a recurrent theme ina
I
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The stalemate withtn the Systemcontinued, with on!s minorvariations throuehout the next sear. Harrisonwas pressed on the one sideby hit officers and directors__though lessconsistently by the directorsthafl in the preceding vear-to workfor greater easing and largerpurchases O the other side, he felt strongly hisresponsibilities, as chairman oftliOpen Market Policy Conference,to earn out loyally the polityadopted by she Conference Th one major differencein the situationwas the rejdace.
ment of Roy Young by Eugene \Ieveras gos's'rrsor of the FederalRcrr' Board. Young becamegovernor of tlit' Boston Bank inSeptember 103(1 and, a's such wasa member of the executive Cottlnsjttepof the Coitferetice where he joined Mcfloiigalin consistently opposing purchasesand fasor. tng sales.14 Meyer ssaseenerally ras's'rable towardpiirchas ansi,not having cone throti"h Harrison'siriistratjnr experience of 193injind to press strongly for them.
The January 193!rneetirsg of the Open sfarketPnlCozitrenre hrougout clearli the changes inthe situation. FromOctober to mid. December 1930, there hadbeenvirtually no change inthe Svsteyp's holdings ofpos'ernnlent securities The hkjncdifficuht5 in NewYork following the failureof the Bank of UnitedStates in the secondseek of December necessitatedpurchase of $45 millionof government5Cctjritj b' the New YorkRe5t't ye Rank for itsown account Thwere bü0s1 from tsso banksundergoinheavy withdrawalsof currency in otdcrto enable thenmi to avoidborrowing In addition$80 million ofgovernment secunties were purchasedfor Systemaccount, as Harrison explained"in order to avoid toogreat ttghteninof credit dueto an untssttalamount of 'windoss' dressing'"The purchaseswere made in accordancewith the authorization by theConference meetingon September 25. 193as a compromtse betssepn theadvocates oi "anticipa(ionand "correction " of purchases up to.S 100 million forseasonal easeAt its January I9i
the deliheranonsof the period.e g., Harrison \IisccIl100115,Vol 1It':ter dated Mar ii, 1935)J, ft. Case !chajmjanof the Nrw YorkBank ito Governor \'ouid OtsoLJ Apr 24,930: Miscellaneous'elIletrdated Apr 29 Uarr.scn to Plati; ibid., letterdated July5),930 J. B McDnuai'0 1 l,trriso's According to HanilinYoung was easedoust of hisositlon on the Bsardbe' cause of me administration's





ting,the Open Market Policy Conference recostinsendeci that"it
would be desirable to disposeof some of the System holdirws of govern-
ment securities asand when opportunity atlords itself to do this without
disturbance or anytiehtening of the money posttio,'t' When the mern-
hers of the Resers cBoard met subsequently with tiw stovernors, both
Adolph Miller and EugeneMeyer objected. Harrison. in isis capacity as
chairman of the Conference,defended the reconunendation 011 therostnd
that it'represcilled a compromise since some of those present were in
favor of consideral)lesales of securities, white others were only in favor
of such moderate sates asmight he necessary to take up the slack:' Mr'ver.
sensitive to political reperCuSsiOns,stated that
a reduction ofbills and discountsofthe System didtintinvolvetb.
launching of ai'tiiaJor polu'v, whereasthe sale of governmentss crnrnnnls
interpreted as a msj'r rnoe in Federal reserve policy.The Reserve Svstsnt
has bern accused ii atiiinhrr of quarters of pursuing a ds'fiatioi ,jt-' policy in
the past year. and a saleof government securities at this tune is likely to drass
fireIn this sitUati°ti ii would appear Iliostdesirable to avnid a sons's' sshjcii ap-
pears topr('seflCaili.ijOr changein poi icyss hen th crcis no n'c,-s:i 'for
doing it.
Despite Meyers reservations, theBoard approved the Conference's recom-
mendation and, by February 1931. seCurityholdings had fallen by $130
million.hliough there was concern about the associated tighteningof
the bond market.15
to that date were only$10 million from one large batik The purchases for System
account after Dec 20 were madeliv New York at its (IWO dsrre!inn. the executive
committee at a meeting on that day inVashington wth (;mernor Mover and
several Board members having aerceC' to leave it to the jsidrrnc-nt of the F,'deral
Resete Bank of New Yorkwhether sonic additional aniouct cf gos ernrtierit
securities should be pucehased withinshe $1 P0.000OliO aurhoritv with tie nznder-
star.dirig that the New York bankwould keep in close cottsmunicatiois ss itli she
members of the committee"ibid., minutes of executive comniittce ttieeting.Dcc,
1930).
The original resolution as passedhad the word "unItsi' "'I,swi deletedhe-
Icrotightening."
Harrison. Open Market. \'ol.Ii.s-tunutes of itii'ettnC. Jan. 2!.1931. and
letter, dated Jan 299.11. McClellandfor Boardinllarrsun. appros ing she
recommendation'. Notes, Vol. 1. Jan. 15, 19. 22.19:11.
A memorandum on die Open MarketPolicy Conference meeting of Jan. 2
193!. written be E A C;oldenweisrr. theFederal Reserse Systems directotol
research, stated:
Meyer strongly onposes sales of securitiesbeyond thi- amount bought in Decern-
ber tor seasonal and special purposes....The rest Fhe soser:cors did noi
change their minds. toil were impressed byMeyers on -ritssod force.It ap-
pears in base been his first boutwith the intrenched hard-tt:oiicscrossd of the
Federal reserve system
The memorandumis part of the Goldenwemser Papers inthe Manaseript Disision
cf theLibrary of CongressContainerI.folder of Contidefltm3i Memoranda
"1'2
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in April1931, hat rison,as chairman if the Oieri M:irket Pohy
Conference, presented a report to the Governors Conference, lie cx-
pressed great concern about the poki infiow and the lancet s to the world
of continuedoid su'rtlization by the United States.1As to the domestic
situation, he noted:
Whilets commonly stated that mmcv condit,'rs hate b'n t'.sc,'i (iifl:!R'
easyrirecent mc'nr hs, and '.v ii Icjust ed rn tnevr,i t es ha'.5'''tI.11 very
levels there has not bitt os't'r a period ci tntuiths antCfl',Ist.'flt mrplus if
Federal reserve funds pressIt g foruist' upt Lutilt mark'' I ur t h , 'riot,-
apart loin the rt'lat!st'lv easy position of the boriC iii tbi !ar'rIii'S. credit
cannotIn's,s!ito he t,'ry'bu':tp or vi'rssl'ntifsu1L'''II''u,iIls'thr''iighrsiitth-
coii It rv.
Harrison's report was discuscd at the Open sIauhi't Policy Conferenc,',
which approved, at his ureinsc, a three-part Pt oraits to niakei!d imports
more effective :tnd credit more active: nlatntt-nancs' ii ilit' roll portfolio.
if possible: reduction of buying rates on hills arid, less detintelv. of dis-
count rates; andas a last resort, if bills purchased did not enable earn-
ing ast- ts to he maintainedauthority for the ex1'cIitIs C colnitiittee to
purchase up to $100 million of uos'rrnmr'nt sectirittu's. TI:t' resolution in-
cluding the final part of this mild proscramthe only part within the
Conference's exclustve jurisdictionwas adopted with fourrt'itic;ant
supporters, three of the four, ntetnhers of the exccutive comniitteu 11'
No purchases were made under that recommendation until after a June
22 meeting of the executive coninhittee. at which I-harrison u reed psir-
chases of S50 million. \Eevi-r, who was present at thr'na''tin-' stronok
stipported I-harrison. saviroc that "the Federal RcserBoard wotiki
have sonic preference fir a larger program of pttrciilsio The
authoriyation was granted with only one neeattvc voteY,oun'' ui
because Norris of Philadelphia abstairted and Mefloical of (:hica
voted against his convlctiofls out of deference toPt ,'sidertjlions it's
proposal. anuiou riced two slays earlier, of a rnoratuarnitn c,n in Itnero-
nientai debts ("purchases ofovernmc-nts would be received bthe puiulic
as Supporting the President's annouinct'rnr'rit''. On July 9, the cx"cutis"
1923-33. Ot the ',-'.erI cardtotrd letter fliesdi'r i','rf as cont,sine-rs in115' i,'. -
sum's recordson Is-sit a ric en to readers :the set '- ci h mt re our,,' 3
19fl5 only UPOwr:tr,n pennss:zi:fr,smn Mrs. (''ldenw,'jsSr (53vsr,alt Ira'
of the open Collectin eJflt,IInss'iizrt'rltOl1.iivS,'SofF':dsralRu'cr'çolirvcc
1919 -45. the period of (3oirjr,iwi'ser's se,'ie ss :th the Board'l't:c (,:':,ecine'sr
Papers are meaccersc.. erape rssrm cared tob.liarrisorPa:e,'rs ansi t'res sic a far
less coniprettc:scise'.ate uioni w:m}c:uithe Federal Resec-.e Settee: thai' tIe ii '"''i
Diary does. CnnscqutIv, we has a n:ade' onlyiiior rise of
Sec qu'auioa from his report in sect. -1abcs-c
'Open Market.'ol. ii. Apr.27, 1931.
Norris of Philadelphia, Voting of Boston. and \kDolof Chika:o'Isa'
fourth was Calkins of San Franciscobz,i,tninutes of tnr'etiir \ir9 1°I
S
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committee agreed to a further purchase of $'iO million to completethe
$100 million authorized in April. hut buying W5S stopped on July 16at
$30 rililion bccau;e of I{arrisun'CuI,LrUI over foreign developments
arid despite the rensonstrancs of Meyer
By early August, Harrison and Meyer aCairu 1)ressed for purchases In
discussing the situation with the execusuvi' coinuusitree of directors ofthe
New York Bank, Meyer preser.tt'd figures showing that between Novem-
ber1,1930, and Augtst 5, 1931, there had been "a total increaseof
s421.000.00() in the gold stock of the United Statesthat currency circu-
lation had increased $350,000,000 instead of showing a normal seasonal
decline of at least $100.000,000: and that the Bank of France had with-
drawn about $ 125,000.000 from the market" (presumably the acceptance
market) - He then pointed out that "while there had been no intentional
contraction of the base on which credit could be extended, the steriliza-
tion of an amount larger than the gain of told had been passively per.
mined." He said that. ''if we had been asked last November whetherwe
would favor, or even permit, the sterilization of $400,000,000 of gold.
undoubtedi we would have answered in the negative.''uhz
When a majority of the executive committee of the Open Market Policy
Conference proved to be unwilling to support further purchases. a meet-
ing of the full Conference was called for August II. Harrison proposed a
program. to be put into effect when desirable, authorizing the executive
committee to buy up to $300 million of government securities, Other
governors, except Black of Atlanta who joined Harrison in favor of it,
were entirely negative in their reaction, and the Conference voted instead
an authorization for the executive committee to bus' or sell $120 million.513
So far as we can discover, that was the first Conference meeting at
which there was explicit reference to a problem later to be cited as a
major reason for the Reserve System's failure to make any extensive
security purchasesthe problem of free gold. However, the free gold
problem, to be discussed in the next section, played no role in the
outcome.
When the Conference met the same day with members of the Board,
Harrison was again in the position of having to present and defend a
recommendation he did not favor. He explained that the Conference
opposed immediate purchases of large amounts of government securities,
because banks would not employ excess reserves. The banks' reason:
Harrison, Open Market, Vol. Il. minutes of executive meeting. June 22, 1931;
Mircellaneou, Vol. I, letter, dated July 9, 1931, Harrison to Seay; Notes, Vol. I,
July 16, 23, 1931.
"Notci, \'nl. 11. Aug. 10. 1931.
Open Market, Vol. 11, minutes of executive committee meeting, Aug. 4, 1931;
minutes of meeting. Aug. 11,1931. The $120 million iracluded the usual $100
million plus the $20 million authorized in April but not used.p
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"flu icr prinie nvectn'nts ur.'s.'liritnit I very k'tcic!d basis,
ondary bonds consist largely of railroad ISS&iCS, of whicht Considerable
proportion TrIIy ifl a short time become tnelityihle foi investment bysat.
ings banks, insurance companies, and trust funds, dsito the Provisions
of various state laws. in addition the bond market has beenincert.sirs
hec.iuse of pressure on the market, due to forced liquidation ofbo1
portfolios of closed banks" Governor MeYer and other inenibersof the
Board expressed disappoininsetit at the action taken by the Conference
"in that it limited possible purchases to an ineffective ansostrit:'However
the only consequence of their disappointmentas a chani.e in the timing
of the Board's session with the Conference. Thereafter, thetwo bodies
discussed policy actions before rather than after the Conferenceadopted
its recornnsendation. Later, when the Board formally consideredthe
recommendation, it did not approve it outright hut delegatedto Goverme
Meyer the authority to approve purchases bitt not sales.u14 In theevent,
not even the $120 million authorization was carried out.
BRITAIN'S DEP.'RTt2RE FROMGOt.i).SEPTEMBER 1931
Britain's departure from gold and the resulting gold outflowfrom the
United States changed the focus of policy-making from theOpen Market
Policy Conference back to the New York Bank. New York hadalways
had, and continued to have, primary responsibility forinternational
monetary relations. The Bank of England, the Bank of France, and other
central banks had always treated the New York Bankas their counterpart
and had conducted negotiations and consultations withit. The Board had
been kept informed, consulted in theprocess, and its approval obtained
Hairison, Open Market, Vol. II, minutes of meetings.Aug. 11, Nov. 30, l93l.
and letter, dated Aug.18. 1931,Meyer to Harrisor,.
Though Harrison was in agreement with Meyeron the substance of the policy
issue, he was disturbed by the Boardsresponse to the Conference recommendation.
and complained to Meyer that it wascontrary to the rules adopted when the
Conference was established. To hitown board of directors Harrison stated:
. .the whole situation emphasized the inherent difficultiesof existing open
market procedure. Direction of system policies bya conference of twelve teen
who roust also consult the Federal Reserve Boardmeans ...that ....c run
a real risk of having no policy at all. Some of the Federalreserve bank go\ernors
aitended the Conference with preconceived ideas which wouldnot admit
of argument, and others in spite of,or perhaps because of, the fact that their
banks would not be able to participate infurther purchases of goernment
securities, looked at the whole question front thenarrow standpoint of their
individual position (Notes, Vol.II, Aug. 20, 1931).
Commenting on the results of that meeting of theConference, Coy' rnor Meyer
said, according to Hamlin, that "Governor Harrisoncould present a matter very
gracefully, but could not sell it: that if the Boardhad taken part in the conference.
he believed the Governors would have followedthe Board and the New York bank' (Haenlin, Diary,Vol. 19, Aug. II, 1931, p. 129).He may have been right
on this occasion, but later experience suggests that hewas unduly sanguine.
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before final action, hut it had never had a major voice in foc'mipolicy.
The other Resene Banks had for the partimp1y bcp kept in-
formed. That had been the practice while Strong was alive and had re-
mained the practice. The most recent instance during the contraction
had been the negotiations in the summer of 1931 in COflUection with
loans to foreign banks.
New York had little doubt about what action to take. At its October
8 meeting, the board of directors voted to raise the discount rate from
11,4 to 2'4 per cent. The arguments given at the meeting were, first, the
gold oi.itflowitself, and second, "advices from France, where foreign
fears concerning the dollar appear to have concentrated, which indicated
that an increase in the rate would be interpreted there more favorably
than otherwise." Some fear was expressed that the rise in rates night
have adverse domestic effects. particularly by interfering with Hoover's
efforts to organize a National Credit Corporation, but that fear was
belittled. Harrison noted that any unfavorable effect on the bond market
could be offset b' security purchases, since the executive committee of
the Open Market Policy Conference still had authority, under the recom-
mendation of the August 11 meeting, to buy up to $120 million of go--
emment securities."5 The only discordant note was a cablegram from
Burgess, who was in Europe on a mission for the Bank, recommending
no action that would bring about higher money rates in the United
States.116 The cablegram was read at the meeting, then disregarded. The
Reserve Board promptly approved the rise in discount rates, several of
its members having been strongly in favor of a rise ever since the be-
ginning of the gold drain.ls?
A week later, Eugene Meyer attended the directors' meeting at the
New York Bank. Harrison proposed a further increase in the discount
rate to 3% per cent, giving as the technical reason the continued gold
outflow. One director, Charles E. Mitchell, expressed serious doubts about
the domestic effects. Meyer replied that "an advance in the rate was called
However, three days earlier, at a meeting of the executive committee of the
hoard of directors, Harrison said that "he considered the gold position of the
System paramount at this time and on that account would not be inclined to
purchase Government securities" (Harriscn. Notes, Vol. 11, Oct. 5, 1931).
Burgess had arrived in Europe ocs Oct. 9 to attend a regular monthly meeting
at flas1of thflank for international Settlements. It was the first time a Federal
Reserveofficial had formally participatedindiscussions of European central
bankert at the world bank. The New York Bank was not a member, because it had
been forbidden by the State Deparinsent so subscribe to shares of the 815 when
the latter was formed in 1930. However, there were unofficial ties between the two
institutions, strengthened by the fact that Gates \V. McGarrah, president of the
BuS, had formerly been chairman of the New York Bank.
Hamliri and Miller, at least, strongly favored an increase in discount rates
arid considered a possible effect on the bond market as no valid reason for delay
(Hamlin, Diary, Vol. 19, Oct. 1. 1931, p. l'tB).THE GREAT CONTRACTION
for by every known rule, and that ...forei-ncrs wouldtearcl it
lack of courage if the rate were not advanec(l.' I It' cxnrcsecjthe Opiflio0
th4t ''the bond market was already adjListed lit a lIiLhet k'vdof iitteret
rates, and therefore it would he but little afiecteti.''"A month later,
Owen D. Young pressed the desirability of purchasinggo Cl liflient SCCI1rI.
tiestooffset unfavorable domestic effects.Harrison was
hesitant to accede.°°
The sharp rises in discount rates were widely supportednot only within
the System but also outside.° The maintenance of thecold standardscat
accepted as an objective in support of which mcii ofa broad range of
views were ready to rally. The drain of goldwas a dramatic event
for which there were many precedents.'2' Thus boththe problem and i1s
solution seemed clear and straightforward. Indeed,one gets the impres-
sion that alter grappl;ng with unfamiliar, elusive.and subtle problems,
the System greeted with almost asense of relief the etnereence cia
problem that could be put in black-and-whiteterms.
Less than two weeks after the second rise in discountrates, the execu-
tive committee of the Open Market Policy Conferencemet. The prelimi-
nary memorandum for the meeting outlined the drasticchange that had
occurred in currency in circulation, pointedout that internal develop-
ments had been more important than time goldoutflows in their effects
on domestic business, and noted that the decline indeposits "constitutes
by far the most rapid shrinkage inmember hank deposits during thelife of the System." Nevertheless, McDougafcontinued to recommend that
the System should reduce itssecurity holdings, although-_in additionto
the unprecedented pressureon commercial banks at the timeitwas the beginning of the season when theSystem typically expanded itssecurity holdings. The finaloutcome was a vote against sales bitt infavor of re- questing the Federal ReserveBoard to give the committee thesame leeway for sales that theBoard had given it for purchasesunder the
Conference recommendation ofAugust 122
Harrison, Notes, Vol. II, Oct.15, 1931.
Ibid., Nov. 25, 1931.
'"We think the really constructiveevent of site week has becn..the action of the New York FederalReserve Bank in raising itsrediscount rate This step should have brett taken longago, and, indeed, it was a saderror of judgment to put such a fantastically lowrate as that at f"iew York inforce.....(Con- rnerc,al and Financial Chron1!Oct. 10. 1931,p. 2305). ".- [TIhe Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkhas been driven intomaking another advance ofa full 1% irsits rediscount rate.., a decidedtWISe move.....(ibid, Oct 17. 1931, p3-160). The New YorkTime1 reported that therise was "wclrcsi,ed b" almost all bar.keri" (Oct.II, 1931)that the risewas "hailed with enthusissm in banking circlet" (Oct.16. 193;).
See, however, furtherdiscussion in sect. 6, below.
Harrison. Open Market. Vol.11. memorandum andminutes of executive coni miuce meeting, Oct. 26,1931. in the coar5e ofthe meeting. Harrison notedthat "the free gold position....as not a con.sideratjonat this time
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The preliminary memorandum for a meeting of the fullConference at the end of November noted with satisfaction that the 'foreign
and do-
mestic drains upon bank reserves were met in the classicway bs' rrcasc-
in discount rates conihined with a policy of free lending."It recorded that "one result" of tlrise in discount rates and theassociated rise in
other market rates sas certamly to make bankers and othersmore timid
and reluctant in contemplating new uses of fundsor new enterprises"
It stressed the sharp decline in bond prices and the resultingworsening
of the position of the banks. It discussed the year-end seasonalproblem,
suggesting that purchases "similar to those made lastyear" should be
provided for, and proposed deferring the longer-termpolicy decisions
until after the first of the Year. The Conference adopteda resolution giv.
ing the executive committee authority to purchase up to $200 millionof
governments for seasonal needs.'23 Only part of that authoritywas in fact
exercised. Government security holdings were raised by $75million to the
end of December 1931 and then lowered by $50 million in January1932.
During those months, it is not clear that Harrisonwas as unhappy with
the policy followed as he had been before and was to be again.His con-
cern about gold inhibited his desire to expand Federal Reserve credit.
New York still had control over the buying rate on bills, subjectonly to
the approval of the Board. As we have seen, New York hadrepeatedly
tried to use bill purchases to enable it to accomplish on itsown what it
could not accomplish through the System open marketaccount. Yet the
bill buying rate, which had been raised from l4 percent to 3V8 per
cent in October along withthe discount rate, was reduced onlyslowly
and moderately, to 3 per rent on November 20, andto 2per cent on
January 12. 1932. Both reductions left the rate above themarket rate
and therefore did not lead to an increase in bill holdings.
Early in January 1932, partly under pressure from his staff and directors,
Harrison resumed his advocacy of a program of further substantialpur-
chases as part of a broader national program which he ourhinedto the
meeting of the Open Market Policy Conference that month. The main
features of the program were: passage of an act establishing the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation, then under consideration byCongress;
organized support of the bond market, predicated onan agreement be-
tsveen the railroads and the unions to cut wage rates; cooperation of
Federal Reserve Banks and member banks with the Treasury in its financ-
ing program; purchase of bills by the Reserve System whenpossible; re-
ductions in discount rates; and, as a final step, "buying of Governments,
if necessary, facilitated by an alleviation of the free gold position,"the
WGovernor McDougal askedassurance 1t the meeting that no purchases would
be made immediately. Governors Norrh and F'ancher said'they were not duposed
to approve of the purchase of govei-nrnent securities solely for thepurpose of en-
ablir.g the Ncw York and Chicago banks to keep out of debtat the end of the year"




linal phrase being a refes ence to proposals then undor consideraijeat
whjch
werefinaflembodiedii the CucSit'.tgallAct. Tue Conferenceauthor-
ized the executive committee to purchase up to $200 million,'if
sarv," over three negative votes. 'That authorization was notcxercjscd
at all. Between theanuaty 11 and Februar24. 19i2, meetings03 the
Conference, government security hoidini's declined h- $1 jflj11l)jl!
holdings by $80 million, while discounts rose $20 niiUksn.Federal Reserve
credit outstanding fell by $100 million over the six-wok period
The February meeting of the Open Market PolicyConfetence seas
largely a repetition of the Januaiv meeting, although the pendingpaac
of the Glass-Steagall Act removed the problem of free-gold.At the joint
meeting with the Board preceding the formal business session,Meyer, who
continued as governor of the Board though lie had by thenbeen named
chairman of the RFC as svell, asserted that ''it seemeduiilieccssary for
the banking position to he subjected tosevere strain because of the funds
withdrawn for hoarding.Miller stated that ''lie believed them-cwas never
a safer time to operate boldly than at present.' He indicatedth ...he
would approve purchases on an even larger scale thanthe amounts hio
discussed." McDougal continued toargue that'on general principles he
preferred to see the banks borrowing tosecure funds." The upshot was
a mild expansion in the authority of the executive coumntittee.it was au-
thorized to buy up to $250 million at the approximaterate of .S25 million
a week. McDougal and Young voting inthe negative. immediately
after the general meeting, the executivecommittee voted 3 to 2 to start the
program.
OPEN MARKET PURCHASE PROGRAM or 1932
That modest program wouldvery likely never have been expanded intoa
major one, or perhaps even carriedout, if it had not been for direct and
indirect pressure from Congress. Harrisontold the executive cornnlittce
of his directors on April 4 thatapparently "the only way to forestall
some sort of radical financial legislation byCongress.is to co further and fastersith our own program." WhenHarrison reported to a IoU
meeting of his directors on April7 that the executive conimnittecof the
Open Market Policy Conferencewas deeply divided about the wisdom
of accelerating the purchaseprogram, arid had voted to continue the
existinr program, one of the directors asked'if a more vigorousprogratri
Itarrooii. Open Market,'oI. II. minutesofmeeting Jan II. 1932 McDoucal of Chicago. Scay ofRichmond. and Deputy GovernorDay, representing Governor Calkins 01SanFrancisco were the three whovoed inthe negativeNeither Gosernor '10mg nor any otherrepresentatc of the Boston Bank attended the meeting. Th KansasCityBankwasrepresentedbya director who was not present at the session sshcn the resolutionwas adopted.
I&id., minuies of niectimie. Feb.24. t932THE CREAT CONTRACTION
on the part ofthe Federal Reserve System wouldnot hi' hs'ipfu! in do.
featinsy tie Thomas Lonus bil)atici other sinilar leCislation(o5'ernor
Hrb'1 'cJ that Senator Thomac had ir.dicated to
be satisfied not to l)rt'ss for Corteressiona! action if the Systtsi wouldpro.
ceed more vigorously.' The Bank directors aecordingl. votedto have the
Bank. is;b3ect to the approval of the Board, buy for its ownaccount up to
o million ofuvn'rnnietst securities, outside the Systemaccount and
before niet'tjng of the Conference, which was set forApril1 2.'
In opening the joint meeting of the Conference and theReserve
Board precedinthe business meeting of the Conference, GovernorMeer
'called attention, merely as a matter of information, to the factthat a
resolution had been ntTt't'ilin the Sensate asking the Federal Reserve
Board to state its program.....Consideration of this resoiutionhad
been postponed. He stated that the Reserve System could now undertake
to do more toward aiding in the recovery than it had vet done, and that
he believed the time had come when tite Svsterri might h expected touse
its powers tnore fully in an effort to stop the credit decline." Other triem-
bers of tile Board supported Meyer. Oedr'n L. Mills, since February 13.
1932. Secretary of tile Treasury, who had all alonty been in favor ofmore
extensive action, stated: "For a great central banking system to stand b'
with a 70gold reserve without taking active steps in sucha situation
was almost inconceivahie and almost unforgivable. The resources of the
System should be put to svork on a scale cotnmnensurate with the existing
emercenC\'.
After the Board left. the Conference voted 10 to Ito approve a reso-
lotion offered hr Harrison authori7ing the executive committee to purchase
up to $500 million of government securities in addition to the unexpired
authority granted at the February 24 meeting. The purchases were to be
made as rapidly as practicable and, if possible, to be no less than $100
million in the current statement week ending next day, April 13.'The
NNotes, Vol. U, Apr. 4, 7, 1932.
The lone distenter was Governor Young of the Boston Bank, who had said
at the joint session with the Board that he
questioned whether purchases of goserisments which piled up reserves in the
renters would result in the distrihuttons of these funds to other parts of the
ccssntrv. Hr was skeptical of setting the cooperation of the banks without which
success appeared difficult, and was apprehensive that a program of this sort
would develop she animosity of manse hankers, and was apprehensive alto that an
extensive program of purchases of government securities wouid impair the con-
fidence of the public in the Reserve banks. He cited the experience of 1931 as
an indication of the futility of government purchases.
Governor McDeugal of Chicago asked whether the Reserve System "could retain
the confidesce of the public after inaugurating a policy of this sort, which was in
sonic measure inflationary, particularly since itinvolved the use of government
securities as collateral for Federal reserve notes" I Harrison, Open Market, Vol. II.
minutes of meeting, .'\pr. 12, 1932).
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Onal proviso w erted after Harrison had informed the Conferencehe
was scheduled ufy the next u'tv before a subcommittee of theHouse
on a bill that in i.ect would have directed the Reserve System topurchase
in the open market until wholesale prices had risen to their 1926level. He
said that "it would probably be necessary for lism to makesome reference
to the program at that time."
After the initial program ssas voted on April 12, the Systembought
$100 million of government securities per week for live weeks.At the
May 17 meeting, the Conference again voted another $50() millionopen
market purchase, McDougal joining Young in dissenting. At thesugeest ion
of Meyer, the weekly rate of Purchases after that meetingwas reduced
Harrison deplored the reduction: "The temper of Congressis not im-
proving, and the danger of unsound credit proposals isstill great. It
might, therefore, be unwise to give unnecessary substanceto the argument
now being used, that the Federal Reserve System intendsSoon to aban-
don its open market program." Yet in June. partlyno doubt in the hope
of conciliating McDougal and Young, he suggestedto the executive com-
mittee of the Conference that the purchases each weekbe geared to the
maintenance of member bankexcess reserves at a figure somewhere be-
tween $250 and $300 million, the purchases to beas small as possible to
preserve the desired level, but with some increase from weekto week in the
System's holdings, "to avoid the creation ofa feeling that the policy of the
system had been changed."t9
By the end of June, as Burgess summarizedthe results of the program
for the New York directors, total purchasesof $1 billion had offseta
loss of $500 million in gold anda reduction of $400 million in discounts
and bills bought, leaving a net increaseof $100 million in Federal Re.
serve credit outstanding. To Owen D. Young, thismeant that 'most of
our efforts had, in reality, served to checka contraction of credit rather
than to stimulate an expansion of credit.We have been clearing theway
for action, rather than takingaction------A week later, jr. discussing the
pressure from Chicago and Boston to stop theprogram, he said,
As it is. we are asked to stop whenwe are just half way throughour prorarn, when we are iust at the point where furtherpurchases of Government securities
The hearings, which threatenedto develop into a lull-scale investigationof the System, were held by the HouseSubcommittee on Banking and Currencyon HR. 10517 (a bill to stabilizecommodity prices, introduced by Rep.T A!an Goldsboough). Governor Harrison testifiedthat the Federal Reserve "beganso really utilize the" Glas5-Steagall Actonly two days before heappeared before the committee (Congressional Record, House.June 8,1932, p.t2354, remarks of Mr. Goldsborough). See alsoStabilization of Commodity Prices,Hearines before the House Subcommitteeon Banking and Currency, 72d Cong.,lit sets., part 2 pp. 477-478, 500-501.
Harrison, Open Market, Vol. 11.Meyer was referring to theseries of bills 1932; Not, Vol. 11, May 26, 1932.L
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attempt to persuade the directors ofthe Chicago Bank. But all to no
avail.'33
In an attempt to decidi' the issue, the full Open sIarket Policy Con-
ference met on July 11. At the Joint meeting withthe Board, Governor
Meyer suggested that "in determining fssture policy it was important to
consider that the public effect of any discontinuance of the policy which
had bc-en pursued would be unfortunate, and also that in future policy
every effort should be made to secure aneffective united system policy."
He pointed out that "there existed a trend in Congress toward giving the
Systemmore centralization, and that the openmarket program offered a
test of the capacity of the System to function effectively in its present
form:'134 The Conference voted that excess reserves should be maintained
" Notes. Vol. 11, July7, 14, 1932Office. Vol. III. letter, dated July 8.1932,
Harrison to Owen D. Young.
Harrison, Open Market. VolII. Meyer was referring to the series of bills
introduced by Senator Glass (see footnote 29, shoveL the most recent or, Mar 17,
1932, predeccssor5 of the Banking Art 0! 1933. The latest bill was the occasion
for a hitter exchange of letters between Glass and Harrison. With the approval of
the New York Bank's directors, Harrison wrote to Senator Peter Norbeck, chair.
man of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, enclosing a letter he had
sent Glass. Feb. 6, about an earlier draft of the bill, which read itt part as follows:
Many provisions of this bill ate designed further to limit the autonomy of iht
individual Federal reserve banks and to concentrate more arid more power is
the Federal Reserve Board ........Ihe provisions of your bill relating to the
open market committee which is given jurisdiction over operations in bills as
sye!l as government tecuritiec are so cumbersome as to be inimical to the best
interest of Federal reserve operation.-.. The bill requires approval not only
of the Federal Reserve Board but of a committee of 12 representatives of the
several Federal reserve banks.. .. Under the proposed bill no operations its
securities or bankers bills, even the day to day transactions, can be effected,
even in cases of emergency, without approval of the Committee .
To the extent that your bill 1urthr shiftt power and authority from the Federal
reserve banks to the Federal Reserve Board, to that extent,I believe it aims
towards centralized operation and control through a politically constituted body
in Washington.
On Apr. 9. Glass answered Harrison's letter to Norheck, writing:
In my considered view it conStitutes a challenge to statutory authority and an
unyielding antagonism to any restraining influence whatsoever.
you and your board have thus stated in unequivocal terms the misconcep-
tion of the Federal Reserve banking act which so long has been reflected in the
extraordinary policies pursued by the New York bank with respect to both
domestic and foreign transactions.
The "extraordinary policies" referred to by Glass, who was an undeviating follower
of the real bills doctrine, included the use of open market operations in govern-
ment securitiand the failure to restrict loans to real bills only. In his eyes, the
failure was responsible for both the boom and the bust.
Harrison's reply of Apr. 18 concluded the exchange:
The officers and directors of this bank have been just as desirous to do their
part in checking the use of bank credit for excessive speculation as you or anyone
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at approximaty$200 million by purchases limited intotal to thamount
vlousIy authorized by the Conference but not executed$207 jisifliort.
For the giaidance of the executive committee, the Conferencerecorn.
mended purchases not to cx. eed $15 million a week-__except inunusual
or unforeseencircumstancesbut not less than $5 milliona week for the
next four weeks. McDougaL Young, and Sea of Richmond voted against
even this resolution.135
Freed from Congressional pressureCongress adjournedon July
the Conference lapsed into its earlier pattern.'36 The program adopted
was a roinimufli face-saving program, and was carried out at nearly the
minimum level cOnsiStent with the letter of the recommendationMc-
Dougal and Young refused to participate in further purchases. Flarnison
was unwilling to proceed on his own. As a consequence, in the four weeks
after the Conference met, total purchases amounted to $30 million$15
million the first week, then $5 million a week). From August 10 until the
close of the year. the System's holdings remained almost precisely constant
tt1E nANKING PANIC or 1933
The preliminary memorandum for the January 4, 1933, meeting of the
0pen Market Policy Conierence said of the existing Situation, "thata
good start was made toward recovery, that this movement has been inter-
rupted. and is now hesitant and uncertain." At the meeting, both Gover-
nor Meyer and Secretary of the Treasury Mills stressed that any slack-
ening in Federal Reserve open market policy might provide an excuse for
the adoption of inflationary measures by Congress. Governor Flarrison
listed the Congressional sittiation as one of three reasons for holding the
System portfolio of government securities intact; the second was that a
reductionmight operate as a check to the bond market thus retarding
business recovery and further injuring bond portfolios of banks;" the third
else. From their practica! experience in operating a bank in this money center,
they feel that in the long run there is only one really effective method of bring-
ing about this result, arid that is the traditional methodofthe vigorous useof
discount rate and open market operations-.- The tragedy of the experience
of1928 and 1929 lay, in our opinion, in the failure of the Resere System
promptly and vigorously to use the instruments for credit control which decades
of experience have proved to he powerful and eflective (Mi5ce!laneous.Vol. II.
Open Market. VoL II, minutes of meeting. July14, 1932.
'lo the executive committeeofthe New York Bank's boardofdirectors
Harrison reported on July11, 1932.a discussion he had had with Meyer in which
"Governor Meyer agreed as to desirabilityofgoing ahead with the System open
market program taying that, if for no other reason, isis politically impossibie (or
us to stop at this particular time. The program was begun at about the time the
Go!dsborough Bill was introduced in Coner,-ss and if it were terminated Just as
Congress ad)ourned we would he ursicifted next winter" (Notes. Vol. II, July II,
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was that larger excess reserves might lead to the elimination of interest
on deposits in principal centers,thus distributing "thepressure for
putting money to work more widely.' Against those three reasons Hat.
rison listed three others in favor of some reduction of the portfolio: first,
the "System open market policy had not been one to accumulate any
definite amount of securities but rather to check deflation through there-
duction of bank debt and the creation of substantial excess reserves,
which had been accomplished ;" second, any further substantial increase
in excess reserves might not increase pressure on she banks to lend and
invest but would serve only to minimize control when necessary; third,
the open market purchases had enabled the Treasury to borrow cheaply
and "so in some measure has encouraged the continuance of an unbal-
anced budget."
The sentiment of most governors was clearly in favor of reducing the
portfolio, and the final motion reflected that sentiment,it gave the
executive committee authority to reduce the System's holdings of Treasury
bills, the reduction in January not to exceed $125 million andnot to
bring excess reserves below $500 million. The committee was authorized
to purchase securities if necessary to prevent excess reserves from falling
below the existing level, but not if such purchases would do more than
make up for declines in holdings. Before any increase in security holdings
above the existing level was made, a new meeting of the Conferencewas
to be convened.15'
The policy recommendation was followed, and security holdingsre-
duced by $90 million in January, despite the concern of Burgessand
Treasury officials about the weakness of the bond market, and despitere-
newed banking difficulties. By February 1,1933, excess reserves had
fallen below $500 million, and the purchases madewere not enough to
restore that level. From the last week in January to February 15, the Svs'.
tern increased its security holdings by $45 million, and permitted total
Reserve credit to rise by $70 million. Yet, in those threeweeks alone,
member bank reserve balances at Federal ReserveBanks declined b'
$280 million.
The state to which open market operationstheroost potent mone-
tary tool of the Systemhad fallenwas graphically revealed when, as the
banking difficulties mounted in February, Harrisonruled out a meeting of
the Conference on grounds that itwould be "difficult, if not impossible,
to hold a meeting of the system Open MarketPolicy Conference at this
time." Instead, New York turnedto bills as an alternative. On February
16, New York requested, and theBoard approved, a reduction in its mini-
mum buying rates on bills to % of 1per cent. It acquired $350 million in
Harrison, Open Market, Vol. IIpreliminary memorandum, dated Dcc. 3!,
1932, and minutes of meeting Jan. 4S1933.
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bills the following twoweeks, though at tire end of the second the Bank
the bill rate twice, toIper cent on February 2?, and to 31/i
per cent onMarch 1,in consonance with rises in the discountrate.
It alsoacquirer! $25 million of government securities in the first of the two
weeks and $2 millionin the second, primarily to enable banks to liqui.
date by selling governmentsecurities instead of borrowing on them.1
Jo the final twomonths prior to the banking holiday, there was nothing
that could becalled a System policy. The System was demoralized. Each
Bank was operating onits own. All participated in tire general atmos-
phere of panic that wasspreading in the financial community and the
community at large. The leadership which an independent central bank-
ing system wassupposed to give the market and the ability to withstand
the pressures ofpolitics arid of profit alike and to act counter to the mar-
ket as a whole,thesethe justification for establishing a quasi-govern.
mental institution with broad powersWere conspicuous by their absence.
6. Alternative Policies
Itis clear that the monetarypolicies followed from 1929 to 1933 were
not the inevitableresult of external pressure. At all times, alternative
policies were available and were being seriously proposed for adoption
by leading figures in theSstem. At all times, the System was tech-
nically in a position to adopt the alternative policies.
To give a clearer idea of the consequences of the policies actually
followed, we consider explicitly the alternatives available at three critical
periods and what their effects might have been. Theperiods are:
)l) the first ten months of 1930;(2) the first eight months of 1931;
(3) the four months following Britain'sdeparture from gold in September
1931. This is followed by an evaluation of thechief justification that has
been offered by writers on Federal Reservehistory for the policy actually
pursued in late 1931 and early 1932, namely. that a shortage of "free
gold" greatly inhibited use of the policy alternatives available to theSystem
until the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act at the end ofFebruary 1932.
The successive banking crises which followed thefirst period and
occurred during the other two were, as we saw in section 2,each more
severe than the preceding. Measuresthat might have been adequate to
cope with the earlier ones would havebeen inadequate for the later ones.
On the other hand, as we shall s"e. the bond purchasesactually made in
the spring and summer of 1932, which did halt thedecline in the stock of
money but ssere inadequate to prevent asubsequent relapse some months
after, would have beers more than adequate to copewith the earlier
crises. As so often in human affairs, a stitch in time savesnine.
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